Chapter 8
Plancenoit was the largest village in the region with a parish church, walled churchyard and cobbled streets. It was bigger than Smohain or Mont St Jean, the buildings of which were grouped around road junctions, rather than spread out in a network of streets. Plancenoit’s narrow streets and well-built houses made it easy to defend. The majority of the villagers had fled when the armies approached and the French had broken into many houses, smashing up doors, window shutters and furniture to fuel their fires during the night.
Although Wellington was soon aware of the Prussians’ arrival, Blücher refused to be rushed, despite increasingly urgent pleas for assistance. As Bülow’s IV Corps began to arrive, he placed them in formation but allowed the soldiers some respite after their long march once they reached Chapelle-St Lambert. Immediately committing these tired and footsore men into combat would have been foolish but, even though they were permitted some rest, many had still not received any provisions that day.
Once the French detected the Prussian advance, Napoleon sent infantry under Lobau to meet the threat but until they arrived, only cavalry stood in their way. Count von Schwerin’s Cavalry Brigade was in the vanguard and soon clashed with the French cavalry protecting the extreme right flank of the French army on the edge of the Bois de Paris. Schwerin was among the first Prussians killed as they pressed forward to test their metal in a series of charges and melees.
Colonel Marbot’s 7th Hussars were among the first to skirmish with the Prussian cavalry vanguard and tried to delay them as long as possible. He recalled: ‘The head of the Prussian column approached, though very slowly. Two times I threw back into the valley the hussars and lancers which preceded it. I strove to win time by holding the enemy at bay as much as possible. The enemy could only debouch with great difficulty from the muddy, sunken tracks in which he was engaged.’
Although it took time for the Prussians to deploy, Blücher commented that at first they ‘did not appear to be paying any attention to our existence’. Initially troops were sent in two separate directions and they tried to advance upon a very wide front. The main assault was directed against Plancenoit.
Prussian columns began to emerge from the Bois de Paris, roughly 3,500yd (3,200m) from Plancenoit, at around 4.30pm. They began to establish themselves in the open fields before the woods in preparation for an assault but, with only two brigades available, Blücher wanted the other half of Bülow’s Corps in place before ordering an attack. When messengers arrived from Wellington imploring the Prussians to intervene, Blücher finally relented and ordered his artillery to begin firing upon Domon’s cavalry, sending the attack forward between 4.40 and 5.00pm while the rest of IV Corps was still on the march.
Two regiments of cavalry now advanced on the flanks of the Prussian attack with three artillery batteries following in support. The infantry of Losthin marched forward on the right of the road to Plancenoit, while Hiller’s brigade advanced on the left. Yet the French refused to adopt a passive defence and Domon immediately sent his cavalry forward to engage the Prussian hussars. In the fight that followed, the Prussians were forced to retire after a vicious melee and the French then charged against the artillery batteries behind them. They were only repulsed after the infantry halted their march and levelled a heavy fire against them. Bülow recorded that the attack began well:
Our artillery fire and that of our skirmishers chased the enemy from one undulation to another. Where our skirmishers had obtained a solid foothold, the artillery advanced with the rapidity the situation demanded and passed them to direct its fire at short range against the enemy. The line of massed battalions followed and behind came the supporting cavalry, watching the advancing line of skirmishers ceaselessly.
General Friedrich Wilhelm von Bülow whose IV Corps bore the brunt of the fighting in Plancenoit. (T Johnson)
The French cavalry mounted several charges but these lessened with intensity as the Prussians pressed forward and they confined themselves to trying to menace and delay their progress, particularly after the 8th Hussars under Major von Colomb inflicted losses upon them in an effective counter-attack. Colonel August Pétiet wrote that the Prussian artillery fire was becoming increasingly effective and recalled one incident when General Jacquinot:
saw a cannonball smash into the flank of the neighbouring cavalry division, of Lieutenant General Subervie. The ball beheaded one squadron commander, took two legs off the horse of another and killed the mount of … Jacquinot, commander of the 1st Lancers and brother of the divisional general. At a stroke, the three senior officers of the 1st Lancers were down …
Lobau blocked their progress briefly with his VI Corps as the brigades of Losthin and Hiller approached Plancenoit. Although they slowed the Prussian advance, they were outnumbered and forced to retire into the village at around 5.30pm. Plancenoit was occupied by a full brigade but the Prussians did not pause and immediately assaulted the village.
Almost two-thirds of IV Corps were Landwehr and as Müffling had confided to Wellington earlier: ‘Our infantry doesn’t possess the same physical force and capacity to resist as yours. Most of our troops are young and inexperienced.’ However, Napoleon’s imperialism had stirred up great national feeling in the German states and many were inspired by a fierce hatred of the French. Yet because of their enthusiasm, many units expended their ammunition too quickly and the inexperience of their officers meant that the attack was not as well co-ordinated as it should have been.
FRIENDLY FIRE
Wellington had been delighted when Prussian troops began to appear on his left but was alarmed when they were withdrawn. Although he could see smoke rising above Plancenoit, the sound of the battle around him made it difficult to determine how serious the action being fought there actually was. He repeatedly sent messages to Blücher advising him to hurry as his line was hard pressed.
As Ziethen’s I Corps approached the village of Ohain, Major von Gillhausen of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr wrote how they marched in column on either side of the road in an attempt to avoid cannon fire that was now being directed against them. In spite of this:
we hoped to keep the battalions out of the heavy artillery fire whose direction was constantly changing, but without deviating significantly from our objective. However, I could not prevent one cannonball striking the left of the III Battalion, killing two men and wounding three, and another from killing one Jäger and wounding four from the 2 Jäger Detachment.
By around 6.00pm the vanguard of General Ziethen’s leading brigade had reached Ohain. Ziethen’s I Corps had been the last to leave Wavre but had marched along the River Smohain on a more northerly route than the rest of the army. Lieutenant Colonel von Reiche (Ziethen’s chief-of-staff) was busily engaged in planning their deployment when he was greeted by General Baron Philipp von Müffling, who was the Prussian liaison officer attached to Wellington’s staff.
Müffling informed him that Wellington’s line was under severe strain and: ‘The Duke was most desirous of our arrival and had repeatedly declared that this was the last moment, and if we did not arrive soon he would be compelled to retreat.’ Yet when Ziethen arrived, he had no wish to rush forward blindly until his Corps had assembled. He had already turned down a request for immediate support from Colonel Freemantle, at Wellington’s behest. After all, if things were as bad as Müffling said, they might march into the path of an oncoming French assault and suffer accordingly. He sent staff officers ahead to assess the situation and was worried when they returned with an exaggerated report that implied the Anglo-Allied left flank was on the verge of breaking.
When La Haye Sainte fell at around 6.45pm, Wellington’s situation was becoming increasingly desperate. Much depended on the Prussians intervening effectively and he later wrote: ‘The time they occupied in approaching seemed interminable … Both they and my watch seemed to have stuck fast.’ The loss of the farmhouse was a major blow and the French were now pressing forward to exploit their advantage.
Although the cavalry attacks had stopped, the Allies still feared that more might follow. Therefore, battalions were kept in square or adopted a line four-men deep. The downside of this was that they suffered more losses from cannon fire and, since cavalry still menaced them, were usually obliged to stand rather than lie prone to reduce casualties. The Anglo-Allied artillery batteries also had difficulty in recalling all their gun teams as some artillerymen had fled to the rear rather than retire into the infantry squares during the massed cavalry attacks. Therefore, their fire would be significantly weaker if another assault began before they were replaced.
Wellington’s centre now came under a fearful artillery bombardment and it was uncertain whether it could withstand another major assault if the French attacked before he brought up more reserves. They were losing the battle of attrition with the infantry suffering under the cannonade and gaps had started to appear in the line. Observing this the Duke murmured grimly: ‘Give me Blücher … or give me night’.
Major von Scharnhorst now rode up to Ziethen, telling him that IV Corps was struggling to take Placenoit and needed support. He conveyed Blücher’s orders for him to march south-west and assail the village. As Ziethen began to make preparations, French skirmishers were pressing forward beyond the Chemin d’Ohain and d’Erlon’s corps was advancing once again. Aghast at what was happening, Müffling cried out that: ‘The battle is lost if the 1st Corps does not support the Duke!’ Supported by Reiche’s counsel, they managed to persuade Ziethen that the Anglo-Allied command was virtually unaware of events at Plancenoit and diverting his march there would have a ruinous effect on their army’s morale. Although persuaded with great difficulty, Ziethen then took the dangerous step of ignoring orders and continued his advance towards Papelotte.
The Prussian I Corps now began to enter the area around the villages that was traversed by sunken lanes shaded by trees and lined with hedgerows. Their progress was slow and, although 2 hours of daylight remained, their vision was poor in the twilight. As von Reiche later conceded, this led to mistakes as heavy skirmishing was in progress in the area:
The Nassauers who were leaving the village fell back in open order on our advancing troops. As the Nassauers were dressed in the French style of that time, our men took them to be the enemy and fired at them. Their commander Prinz Bernhard of [Saxe] Weimar rushed up to General Ziethen to clarify the misunderstanding, which he did in no uncertain terms. The General, not knowing the Prince, made no excuses and calmly replied, ‘My friend, it is not my fault that your men look like French!’
As the Prussians deployed, there were similar incidents when men of Pack’s Brigade fired upon them, mistaking the Prussian infantry for French soldiers. Fortunately, officers on both sides rapidly stopped these exchanges and I Corps sent out skirmishers and deployed three artillery batteries. As the main battalions advanced, this proved more than enough to halt the French advance in this sector of the battlefield.
Durutte, on the extreme right of the French flank, had only four battalions (roughly 1,500 men) to oppose the Saxe-Weimar’s command, now reinforced by just under 4,000 Prussians. Although heavily outnumbered, the hedgerows and undulating ground enabled them to stave off the Allied/Prussian advance. Durutte held out stubbornly but knew that it was only a matter of time before he would have to withdraw, unless he received support.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL COUNT HANS ERNST ZIETHEN, 1770–1848
Hans Ziethen began his military career in 1806 serving with the Prussian Queen’s Dragoons. He campaigned against France (1813–14), commanding a brigade under General Kleist and fighting at the gigantic Battle of the Nations at Leipzig 1813. Promoted to lieutenant general in 1815, he was one of Prussia’s most experienced commanders and consequently received command of Blücher’s I Corps.
Heavily engaged during the Battle of Ligny, I Corps suffered serious casualties but Ziethen managed to withdraw in good order and morale and cohesion had improved by the time it reached Wavre. It was the second Prussian corps to reach Waterloo, arriving 3 miles (4.8km) from Wellington’s position at the village of Ohain at 6.00pm after a gruelling forced march.
When approached by Lieutenant Colonel Freemantle (and later other members of Wellington’s staff) at Ohain, he refused to commit his troops until I Corps had fully assembled and later received considerable criticism from some historians in consequence. Despite the urgency of Freeemantle’s request, his reasoning that the men needed rest after their long march and time to form for battle seems sound enough.
Although ordered to redirect his march to Plancenoit by Blücher, Ziethen took the courageous decision to conform to Wellington’s right flank instead when Müffling convinced him that the Anglo-Allied Army would break without his support. This proved to be a crucial decision as it allowed Wellington some respite and permitted him time to prepare for Napoleon’s final assault. Historians sometimes overlook this point but the effect of Ziethen’s decision on the outcome of the battle should not be underrated.
After the 1815 campaign, Ziethen became Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Army occupying France in Blücher’s absence. He went on to rise within the military and ended his career as a field marshal.
The final assaults on Plancenoit.
COUNTER-ATTACK
By 6.00pm, Blücher had the rest of IV Corps at his disposal and now had thirty-four battalions to draw upon for his attack against Plancenoit. The 16th Brigade (under Hiller) and the 15th Brigade (under Losthin) therefore renewed their assaults on the village. The new arrivals included more regular battalions and the assault was spearheaded by the 11th Infantry under Colonel von Reichenbach. The Landwehr regiments in Ryssel’s Brigade were also of superior quality and these fresh troops formed the backbone of the attack.
Lobau’s men had been fighting for hours and were massively outnumbered. The French brigades flanking the village were forced to retreat and Lobau started to pull out of the Plancenoit itself, fearing the brigade there would be outflanked. Long-range Prussian artillery fire was already beginning to fall around the highway where the Imperial Guard stood and even near the point where the Emperor and his staff were postioned directing the battle.
Houssaye believed that when the first attacks began against Plancenoit Napoleon could hear the cannonade in Wavre and assumed that Grouchy had fallen on the rear of the Prussian Army. Consequently, he thought that the Prussians would be unlikely to commit more than a single corps to the struggle. Yet, as more Prussian troops were seen advancing in the distance, the village was clearly under great threat. The Emperor knew that if they captured Plancenoit, his entire right wing would crumble, enabling the enemy to roll up the French line and fall upon his centre. Reluctantly, he commanded General Philibert Duhesme to lead his eight battalions of the Young Guard, accompanied by three artillery batteries with a combined twenty-four guns, into Plancenoit to shore up its defence.
On the edge of Plancenoit near the Prussian Memorial. The Prussians approached from this direction and the land is still wooded and traversed mainly by farm tracks, just as it was in 1815.
The Young Guard Division was composed of two brigades of light infantry. These troops were either tirailleurs, whose meaning translates as ‘skirmishers’ or ‘sharpshooters’, or voltigeurs, whose name means ‘vaulter’ or ‘leaper’. All of the Young Guard were experienced soldiers taught to think for themselves and fight in small groups in a skirmishing role. They were the ideal troops to commit to the confused street fighting in Plancenoit.
The Prussian attack had faltered in the centre where they still encountered major resistance but some light infantry had advanced around it and had taken up position in the houses and behind walls on the western side of the village. As Duhesme led his battalions forward, they came under sporadic musket fire but he forbade his men to waste time by returning it and pressed forward into the streets. They charged into Plancenoit and broke into the houses to roust out the defenders in savage hand-to-hand fighting. Soon the Young Guard reached the centre where the fighting still raged.
With Lobau’s crumbling defence reinforced by the Young Guard, the fighting intensified and the French gained the upper hand. Regiments like the staunchly Bonapartist 15th Ligne still held out and the Prussians were swiftly forced back and then routed. Skirmishers from the Young Guard actually pursued them beyond the village but were checked by the fire of Prussian battalions reforming at the edge of the woods. The 2nd Silesian’s regimental history then records that: ‘a squadron of the 2nd Silesian Hussar Regiment charged them, cutting down some of them and chasing them back’.
The village of Plancenoit. With the arrival of the Prussians, possession of this village became crucial for one side to win the battle.
Blücher was furious at the reverse and personally rode to help rally the 16th Brigade. Haranguing the largely Westphalian and Silesian troops, he told them that gaining possession of the village was vital if they were to win this battle. He knew that Thielmann was heavily engaged to their rear and the only way was forward. One of his staff heard him snarl: ‘if only we had the damned village!’. Once Plancenoit fell to the Prussians, Napoleon’s position would become untenable.
Bülow’s entire Corps was now deployed and the next attack was massively reinforced. Although the Young Guard fought hard, the Prussians entered the village once again and soon fought their way back into the centre. Colonel Hiller recorded how his men of the 15th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Silesian Landwehr sustained heavy losses from canister and musketry on their approach but fought their way through the streets and:
penetrated to the high wall around the churchyard held by the French Young Guard. These two columns succeeded in capturing a howitzer, two cannon, several ammunition wagons and two staff officers along with several hundred men. The open square around the churchyard was surrounded by houses, from which the enemy could not be dislodged in spite of our brave attempt. A firefight continued at fifteen to thirty paces range which ultimately decimated the Prussian battalions. Had I, at this moment, the support of only one fresh battalion at hand, this attack would indeed have been successful.
The Young Guard were hard pressed and numbers of them surrendered but the Prussians were disinclined to take prisoners after the slaughter in the village and many were abruptly shot or bayoneted.
GENERAL COUNT PHILIBERT GUILLAUME DUHESME, 1766–1815
Rising from obscure origins, Duhesme was a labourer’s son and began his military career in the National Guard in 1789. The French Revolution assisted his career and he joined the Army of the North in 1792 becoming a general of brigade by 1794. He distinguished himself at the Battle of Fleurus and fought in Italy in 1798–9. Thereafter he received a series of Italian commands until 1807.
Sent to Spain in 1808, he played a major role in reducing the citadel of Barcelona but was recalled to France to face charges of corruption in 1810. He was dismissed from his post as Governor of Barcelona due to these allegations but was also implicated in charges of banditry, torture and murder. Although these charges were never proved, the stigma they attached to his name meant that he languished on half pay in a state of semi-retirement for some years.
By 1813, Napoleon desperately needed good officers and the seedier side of Duhesme’s past was overlooked, resulting in his recall to active service. Given a divisional command under Marshal Victor, he fought at Brienne and La Rothière and was created a Count of Empire in recognition of his services. As a staunch Republican, Duhesme felt Napoleon had betrayed the ideals of the Revolution and was initially reluctant to support him when he returned from Elba. Yet he eventually relented and was rewarded with the command of the Young Guard.
He led his division well at Plancenoit and held back the Prussian advance for some time until overwhelmed by superior numbers. Shot in the head somewhere near the edge of the village, he almost lost consciousness and was carried from the field. Supporting the stricken general in the saddle, his officers managed to lead him away but were forced to leave him at the Roi d’Espagne Inn at Genappe during the rout of the Armée du Nord. Officers on Blücher’s staff discovered him there the next morning but he died of his wounds the following day. Duhesme was buried in the nearby village of Ways in the Church of St Martin’s graveyard, where his tomb can be seen to this day.
NO QUARTER
Aware that it was vital to secure his right before mounting another attack, Napoleon had formed up the Imperial Guard (Old and Middle Guard) in a long line facing eastward in case the Prussians broke through. Yet he still hoped to win the battle and now committed two of their finest battalions to reinforce Duhesme. It would weaken his final assault but the Emperor had no choice. He selected the first battalions of the 2nd Grenadiers and the Chasseurs à Pied of the Old Guard. Between them, they only fielded about 1,000 bayonets but these famous elite troops were fanatically loyal to the Emperor and were reliable. Captain Mauduit described their pedigree in 1815: ‘the average age of the grenadiers was 35 years old … average service … was 15 years and as many campaigns … Long-tested by marches, fatigues, deprivations, bivouacs … the grenadier of the Guard was lean and thin’.
Indeed, contrary to some depictions of the Guard, most soldiers were old in experience rather than actual years. British artist Benjamin Haydon saw infantry of the Old Guard at close quarters at Fontainbleu in 1814 and left a graphic description of their fearsome appearance: ‘More dreadful looking fellows than Napoleon’s Guard I had never seen. They had the look of thoroughbred, veteran, disciplined banditi. Depravity, recklessness, and bloodthirstiness were burned into their faces … Black moustache, gigantic bearskins, and a ferocious expression were their characteristics.’ Unusually they were also permitted to wear earrings and, despite the impeccable turnout of their uniforms, this added to Haydon’s impression that they resembled brigands rather than soldiers. The Guard enjoyed many privileges denied to the rest of the army and, although this occasionally provoked resentment in the line regiments, most soldiers acknowledged that Napoleon’s ‘immortals’ had gained their elite status through battle and many wished to earn a place in their ranks. Even the privates enjoyed an exalted status (classed as corporals in the rest of the army) and they received better pay, rations and accommodation. Yet this had to be weighed against the fact that all of them were experienced soldiers who had endured the rigours of campaigning many times before. Furthermore, although held in reserve for a potential decisive stroke, they always earned their pay when called upon.
It was maddening as Napoleon only had around thirteen battalions of the Middle and Old Guard left for his last attempt against the Anglo-Allied line. Was it enough to break through? The guns of the Grande Batterie thundered on, pounding the Allied centre and his Guard were now almost in position but he could not ignore the threat to his right. He chose Generals Pelet and Morand to lead the attack, telling Pelet to: ‘go with your 1st battalion to Plancenoit where the Young Guard is entirely overthrown. Support it. Keep your troops closed up and under control. If you clash with the enemy let it be with the bayonet.’
The battalions advanced in separate columns against the village and received fire from light infantry ensconced behind walls and houses as they neared Plancenoit. Pelet turned to look behind him and roared at his men not to load their muskets and put their faith in cold steel. Elements of the Young Guard falling back from the village took heart at the sight of their advance and officers shouted at them to reform behind their columns and join their attack, which many did. Much of Plancenoit was now in flames and the prospect of advancing into this inferno, with screams and sounds of combat issuing from within, was a grim one, yet the Guard marched on determinedly.
The Prussians were only beginning to take possession of the houses on the edge of the village when the Old Guard stormed Plancenoit. The narrow village streets were already choked with rubble, dead and wounded but the Guardsmen struggled over the debris to engage in a brutal, close-quarters fight with the Prussians. The ferocity of their assault drove their enemy back into the houses or through the village and they pressed on towards the centre where elements of the Young Guard still held out.
Pelet later recalled the bitter struggle from street to street and inside the houses. It was a closely confined area and: ‘At each interval between the gardens, I saw muskets aiming at me forty paces away. I can not imagine how they did not shoot me twenty times.’ Although opposed by as many as fourteen enemy battalions, the Guards drove inexorably through the village and pushed the Prussians out after 20 minutes of hard fighting.
Because the Prussians had hanged some of their prisoners in the village, Pelet saw many men refusing to give quarter to surrendering Prussians being consumed by a blind fury, which often accompanied hand-to-hand fighting. He was horrified to witness the murder of some prisoners and had to wrestle with soldiers or beat them with the flat of his sword to prevent further reprisals. One group had begun to cut the throats of men they had captured en masse before Pelet stopped them. Most of the Young Guard had now rallied and resumed their positions alongside their reinforcements and by 7.00pm Plancenoit was back in French hands.
ONE LAST GAMBLE
Ziethen’s deployment on the Anglo-Allied Army’s left came at a crucial point in the battle. Between 6.45 and 7.30pm as the Old Guard retook Plancenoit, the Duke was reinforcing his battered central positions. He drew Wincke’s Brigade and four battalions of Brunswicker troops closer towards his centre, reinforcing the brigades of Pack, Best and Kempt on the left who had suffered severe losses. The divisions of Donzelot, Allix and Marcognet had all advanced almost to the ridge crest and their skirmishers lined the hedges along the Chemin d’Ohain and sniped at the battalions on the reverse slope. Now the welcome arrival of the Prussian I Corps enabled them to move forward and drive the French back beyond the road. When riflemen re-entered the gravel pit, their accurate fire killed many of the artillerymen around the guns brought up close to La Haye Sainte. Although this silenced them, their fire had already wrought considerable damage on the infantry around the centre from close range.
Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian Division also arrived from Braine d’Alleud to help fill the gaps in Wellington’s line, thinned by successive attacks. The cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur were also recalled from their position on the extreme left. The Duke added these six regiments to his cavalry reserve, massed behind his centre. Wellington’s stubborn defiance had paid off and Prussian efforts had already had a marked effect on the fighting. If Wellington could weather one last attack, victory for the Allies was in sight.
Viewpoints
THE BOIS DE PARIS (FOREST OF PARIS)
Today the forest is smaller than it was in 1815 but large parts of this area remain covered with woodland. The Bois de Paris lay to the east and north-east of Plancenoit. It covered two steep ridges, with a valley in between, and these were eminently defensible by infantry who would have benefited from the cover of the trees if fired upon by artillery. Four country tracks ran through these woods and the bulk of the Prussian army heading towards Mont St Jean were obliged to use them, so the woods were of considerable strategic importance. Had the French occupied them with even a moderate sized force of combined arms, they would probably have delayed the Prussians significantly or even prevented them from intervening at Waterloo. In the event, Lobau was only able to deploy before the woods some 5,468yd (5,000m) from Plancenoit in a line running south-east from Frichermont to block the Prussians as they emerged from the treeline.
COLONEL VON SCHWERIN’S MONUMENT
Colonel Count Wilhelm von Schwerin commanded the 1st Prussian Cavalry Brigade and his 6th Hussars were the first to skirmish with Marbot’s 7th Hussars sent to monitor the area east of the Bois de Paris. Schwerin soon brought up the 1st West Prussian Uhlans to support his hussars but encountered little serious resistance at first. Yet as Domon and Subervie’s cavalry came up, the Prussians received increasing fire from cavalry under the tree line as they approached the woods. Firing their notoriously inaccurate short carbines either dismounted or from the saddle, this initially had little effect except to delay their advance. However, the French also brought up a horse artillery battery whose fire brought down many riders as Schwerin began to deploy for an attack. Colonel Schwerin was killed in the early stages of this engagement and is said to be the first Prussian soldier to die that day on the battlefield of Waterloo.
Initially, Schwerin was buried near to where he fell. As he had probably been killed by roundshot, it is likely that his body would have been badly mutilated, so conveying his remains as far as one of the local churchyards would have been difficult despite the special treatment often afforded to high-ranking officers. Two years afterwards, Countess Sophie Daenhoff (his widow), came to the area and found his shallow grave with the assistance of a local farm girl. She had him disinterred and formally reburied. This monument now stands over his grave and the Countess was so impressed by the locals’ helpfulness that she gave the parish priest an annual subscription of 100 florins for the poor and donated two bells to the church at Lasne.
Schwerin’s monument stands to the west of Lasne village on the road towards Plancenoit. To reach it, drive 109yd (100m) south-west from Lasne church to the crossroads. Taking the branch towards Plancenoit, proceed another 54yd (50m) before turning left. Travelling along this route, you will find a small track that leads to the monument, which should be visible before this turning due to its height.
A well-kept hawthorn hedge surrounds the monument, which is a thick, round stone column 16ft (5m) high set upon a square pedestal. A bronze plaque is set upon the monument and its German inscription translates as: ‘William, Count von Schwerin, Knight and Superior Officer of the King, fallen in a foreign country for the Fatherland, during the victory of 18 June 1815’.
PLANCENOIT VILLAGE
The village of Plancenoit witnessed some of the most intense fighting of the battle, particularly during its later stages. In 1815, it was home to around 500 souls, who mostly fled when it became clear that battle was imminent. Its houses were well built with garden walls bordering many properties and the streets were cobbled. The sturdy nature of its buildings made Plancenoit easy to defend and it is surprising that the French had failed to garrison the village before the Prussian approach, particularly as it lies only 1,312yd (1,200m) from the main highway to Brussels. This implies that Napoleon was supremely confident of the outcome of the approaching battle and meant to devote all his resources to breaking the Anglo-Allied Army. Even when the Prussian threat became very serious, he only committed more troops to its defence with marked reluctance.
Today the majority of the houses in the village are modern as, unaccountably, Plancenoit was exempted from the 1914 law protecting Belgian battlefields. Yet layout of the streets remains essentially the same and the Church of St Cathérine (Location Map Reference 16) still dominates the central square. This area is more open than it was in 1815 and is now used as the village green. In common with many similar sites, the village has a pleasant aspect and it is difficult to stand here and imagine that a horrific slaughter took place on this spot, marred by atrocities committed against prisoners by both sides.
The Church of St Cathérine in the centre of Plancenoit. Fighting raged around the church and it was badly damaged during the battle.
One of the plaques on the wall of St Cathérine’s commemorating Lieutenant M Louis and the tirailleurs of the Guard who defended the village almost to the last.
St Cathérine’s was badly damaged in the fighting, which was particularly ferocious around the village centre. Parts of the cemetery wall date back to the time of the battle but the church was virtually demolished during the mid-nineteenth century, later being rebuilt along similar lines. The tower and spire were modified in 1856 but the church still resembles its 1815 appearance.
There are four French-language plaques dedicated to the French soldiers who fought here in and around the church. Two are set on either side of the main church door. The one on the right reads: ‘In this village of Plancenoit that became famous on 18 June 1815, the Young Guard of the Emperor Napoleon distinguished itself. It was commanded by General Count Duhesme, who was fatally wounded’. The memorial plaque to the left of the church door is devoted to a single officer and records: ‘To Lieutenant M. Louis, 3rd Tirailleurs of the Guard, born at Jodoigne 3.4.1787, fell at Plancenoit 18.6.1815’.
Although it is not always possible to enter the church, a marble plaque hangs upon the wall to the left of the main entrance inside next to the Virgin’s Altar. This reads: ‘To the memory of Jaques Cles Adre Tattet, Lieutenant of the Old Guard Artillery, member of the Legion of Honour killed at the start of the battle of 18 June 1815, aged 22 years’.
French artillery played an important part in holding the Prussian onslaught at bay, particularly as they approached the village. Walking into the churchyard itself, another plaque is devoted to them. It is set upon the outer wall of the church and reads: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 8th Foot Artillery Regiment under Colonel Caron fought their guns effectively, the French VI Army Corps’.
Driving or walking through the village to its south-eastern edge, another monument is located at a crossroads on the edge of the village. It is a rectangular stone with a French Eagle above the inscription, in common with many of the French monuments in the region. Its French inscription translates as: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 the 5th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Roussille of Simmer’s Division, fought heroically against the Prussian Corps of General Bülow’.
Killed while defending Plancenoit, Colonel Roussille’s death is particularly tragic as he opposed Napoleon’s restoration but fought for him in spite of his political beliefs. Defying his entreaties, his men went over to the Emperor to a man so Roussille petitioned Napoleon asking to remain in command, arguing ‘my regiment has abandoned me, but I will not abandon it’. Napoleon graciously agreed to his request and the 5th Ligne fought well here under Roussille, who fell for France and his regiment if not for his Emperor.
Walking north from the centre along the road leading towards La Belle Alliance, visitors will find another monument to the Imperial Guard. Placed on a small grass island a few metres before the Prussian Memorial, its inscription records: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 at 5:00pm the Emperor’s Young Guard, under the orders of General Count Duhesme fought gloriously against the Prussians of General Bülow’. Just over 4,500 men, drawn from 8 battalions of the Young Guard, confronted the Prussians to strengthen Napoleon’s right flank in and around this village.
Plancenoit contains many plaques and monuments commemorating the fallen of the French Army. This is significant as the fight for this village is especially relevant to the French, not only for the huge number of casualties they suffered here, but because its possession was crucial for winning the battle. Right up until the final rout of Napoleon’s army, soldiers continued to fight on the village outskirts as they knew that if Plancenoit fell, the entire army could be surrounded and defeated in detail. Although Waterloo was a crushing defeat for France, it could have been even worse if the defenders of Plancenoit had not endured long hours of fighting here.
THE PRUSSIAN MEMORIAL (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 15)
In direct contrast to the provision for the French, there is only one Prussian memorial in Plancenoit. During their relentless assaults against Plancenoit, around 30,000 Prussian infantrymen alone fought for possession of the village, at least 7,000 of whom became casualties. Therefore, to build only one commemorative reminder of this sacrifice, which contributed so much toward the final victory, seems strange. Fortunately, it is a fine monument and a fitting tribute to the bravery of those who gave their lives to seize this stronghold on that great yet terrible day.
The memorial commemorating the Prussian soldiers who took serious losses in repeated assaults against the village of Plancenoit.
Erected in 1819 upon a mound where an artillery battery stood during the battle, accounts differ as to whether this was a Prussian or French position. It is possible that the Prussians, having driven French artillery from here, used the same location to position their guns. Observing the views from the immediate vicinity, a battery here would have been well located for firing on the woods, into the centre of the village and the highway to Brussels. Therefore, it is more than possible that both sides placed guns here at various stages of the battle.
The monument stands on the northern edge of Plancenoit at the beginning of the lane leading to Lasne village. Approaching it from the centre of Plancenoit, take the road leading to La Belle Alliance past the Young Guard Memorial. The road runs directly north and then turns west in a sweeping curve. There are two exits on the right just as the road curves round and taking either of them will allow you to find the monument, which lies close by.
The Prussian Memorial is in the form of a four-faced Gothic iron spire set upon a bluestone base. The spire is jet black and the lettering in a Gothic typeface upon it is highlighted in gold, with a gilt Maltese cross set at its peak. Although trees stand around it, due to its high elevation, it is visible from some distance away and the sun regularly sparkles on its golden cross. Karl Friedrich Schinkel, the architect who designed it, deliberately placed it facing east, so that it looks towards Germany. A stairway runs up from the pavement to the monument, which is surrounded by iron railings.
In 1832, the monument was vandalized by French soldiers as they marched to besiege Antwerp and assist Belgian rebels, fighting against Dutch rule. They pulled down the cross and were in the process of toppling the spire itself when Marshal Gérard intervened and shamed them into halting this act of desecration. Having fought at Wavre, Gérard respected his former enemies and contributed funds to its restoration the same year. The present iron railings were cast by the Royal factory in Berlin and now protect the spire from further depredations.
The simple inscription on the spire is in German and translates as: ‘The King and the Country honour with gratitude the fallen heroes. Let them rest in peace. – La Belle Alliance 18 June 1815’. The monument required further restoration in 1944 and 1965 but is now extremely well maintained and during the author’s last visit it looked almost new due to this standard of care.